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Abstract
Security in a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is not well-
understood. Interactions between components in the Cy-
ber and Physical domains lead to unintended information
flow. This paper makes use of formal information flow mod-
els to describe leakage in a model CPS, the Cooperating
FACTS Power System. Results show that while a casual ob-
server cannot ascertain confidential internal information,
when application semantics, including timing, are consid-
ered, this confidentiality is lost. Model checking is used to
verify the result. The significance of the paper is in showing
an example of the complex interactions that occur between
the Cyber and Physical domains and their impact on secu-
rity.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are integrations of com-
putation with physical processes. Embedded computers and
networks monitor and control physical processes, usually
with feedback loops, and physical processes affect com-
putations and vice versa [12]. CPS applications include
high confidence medical devices and systems, traffic con-
trol and safety, advanced automotive systems, process con-
trol, energy conservation, environmental control, avionics,
instrumentation and critical infrastructure control systems
(such as electric power, water resources, and communica-
tions systems).
Various issues in the study of CPSs need to be addressed
including complex interactions of timing, frequency [19],
security [21], and fault tolerance. This paper focuses on the
security aspects of CPSs. Among the various security as-
pects of confidentiality, integrity and availability, this paper
∗This work was supported in part by NSF MRI award CNS-0420869
and CSR award CCF-0614633, and in part by the Missouri S&T Intelligent
Systems Center.
focuses on the confidentiality of CPSs, especially on infor-
mation flow security. The physical nature of a CPS tends
to expose information flow through actions at the cyber-
physical boundary.
Many CPSs consist of similar elements. In the Cooperat-
ing FACTS Power System (CFPS), an intelligent controller
communicates with other intelligent controllers and makes
decisions via distributed decision making. In the CFPS, an
intelligent controller sits on lines of an electric power sys-
tem to balance the power flow of the entire power system.
Throughout this paper the CFPS is used as the example
to identify and model the information flow in a CPS. The
CFPS serves as a real world example to show the applica-
bility of the proposed process.
The family of Flexible AC Transmission System
(FACTS) devices are power electronic-based controllers
that can rapidly inject or absorb active and reactive power,
thereby affecting power flow across transmission lines; a
FACTS device changes the amount of power flowing on
a particular power line. The use of FACTS devices in a
power system can potentially overcome limitations of the
present manually/mechanically controlled transmission sys-
tem [3][6]. A FACTS Device consists of an embedded
computer that depends on a low voltage control system for
signal processing, which, in turn, depends on a low and a
high voltage power conversion system for rapidly switching
power into the power line. Each FACTS device controls the
power flow on one power line (ControlledLine) and multi-
ple FACTS devices interact with each other via exchanging
messages over a network (Communication). The net effect
of the FACTS devices and the power grid is that each power
line and FACTS device is affected by other power lines and
FACTS devices.
The Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC) device is a
type of FACTS device [6][18] that can modify active power
flow on a power line. In this paper, the FACTS devices
specifically refer to UPFC devices.
FACTS devices are primarily used to prevent cascading
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failures in a power system; one or more lines are lost due to
a downed line or overloaded line and the resulting redirected
power flow stresses the network. Too much power may flow
over lines of inadequate capacity and one-by-one the lines
overload and trip out until a large portion of the power sys-
tem has failed [6]. FACTS device coordination is required
to prevent cascading failures [5][6]. The FACTS devices
themselves communicate over an interconnected computing
network to reach agreement on how power should be routed
or re-routed in the presence of a failure (or contingency in
the world of power systems). After reaching a decision,
each FACTS device acts locally.
Distributed computing management of a power system is
different from a traditional centralized power network man-
agement system; the FACTS devices, collectively, manipu-
late entire CFPS in a decentralized way, making distributed
decisions to control the power system. New security issues
emerge in this management scheme. In [18], a broad inves-
tigation into the operational and security challenges that the
FACTS devices face has been discussed. The North Ameri-
can Electric Regulatory Corporation (NERC) provides a ba-
sis to define permanent cyber security standards [2]. These
provide a cyber security framework (Standard CIP-002-1 to
CIP-009-1) to identify and assist with the protection of crit-
ical cyber Assets to ensure reliable operation of the electric
power system. Distributed management of the CFPS must
protect the confidentiality of internal distributed decisions
to that vulnerabilities to attack are reduced.
This paper identifies the vulnerability of information
flow in a CPS from analyzing the example system’s exe-
cution sequences. Several formal information flow proper-
ties are proven. The introduction of timing into the system
divulges confidential decision making among the FACTS
devices at the cyber/physical boundary.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 INFORMATION FLOW SECURITY
A security model is used to describe any formal state-
ment of a system’s confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity requirements [15]. Using information flow, principals
can infer properties of objects from observing system be-
havior. This is a potential hazard in the Cyber-Physical
world. To be more specific, inferring confidential infor-
mation from the observable information flow is a potential
source of critical information leakage; the information flow
of CFPS needs to be carefully analyzed. Various security
models that analyze multi-level security system behavior
from the access control or execution sequence perspective
have been discussed for decades to address the information
flow problems of a system in the defense community. How-
ever, most of the related publications [14][16] have not been
directly applied to CPSs. One of the reasons formal secu-
rity models are less popular outside the defense area is due
to the complexity. Two important models for this work are
Nondeducibility and Bisimulation-Based NonDeducibility.
Following typical notation, τ ∈ Tr are system traces,τ\x is a
trace purged of all events in the domain of x, τ |x is a trace
restricted to all events in the domain of x, E1|E2 is the paral-
lel composition of event E1 and E2, H,L are High-Level and
Low-Level security domains with high-level and low-level
user in each domain, and I,O are Inputs and Outputs.
2.1.1 Noninterference Model
A system is considered Noninterference secure if a low-
level user’s output does not depend on whether a high-level
user is in the system [10]. NI(ES)≡∀τL ∈ Tr : τ |L= τ\H |L
2.1.2 Nondeducible Model
A system is considered Nondeducible secure if it is impos-
sible for a low-level user, through observing visible events,
to deduce anything about the sequence of inputs made by a
high-level user. In other words, a system is Nondeducible
secure if the low-level observation is compatible with any of
the high-level inputs [14] [15] [16]. ND(ES) ≡ ∀τL,τH ∈
Tr : ∃τ ∈ Tr : τ |L= τL∧ τ |H∩I= τH
2.1.3 Bisimulation-based Non-Deducibility on Compo-
sition Model
A system is considered to have the Bisimulation-based Non-
Deducibility on Composition (BNDC) property, if it can
preserve its security after composition [7]. A system ES
is BNDC if for every high-level process P, a low-level
user cannot distinguish ES from (ES|P)\H (ES composed
with any other process P and purged high-level events). In
other words, a system ES is BNDC if what a low-level user
sees if the system is not modified by composing any high-
level process P with ES. BNDC(ES)≡ ∀pi ∈ EH ,ES/H ≈B
(ES|pi)\H where ES/H changes all the H events in ES into
internal events.
3 INFORMATION FLOW IN A CYBER-
PHYSICAL SYSTEM
Lack of confidentiality of information flow in a CPS can
have catastrophic effects. As an example, consider an in-
stance of the IEEE 118 bus electric power system [13][1].
This is a highly stressed system with many lines near over-
load. There are critical lines that, if removed, will cause
cascading failures throughout the system. From the analysis
in [13][1], if a critical line is removed, several succeeding
lines trip one-by-one due to overload, leading eventually to
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Figure 1. Architecture of CFPS
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Figure 2. Information flow analysis at the
UPFC device level
a cascading failure. If attackers know these critical lines to-
gether with a good guess of line capacity, they can carry out
an effective attack causes a cascading failure of the system
simply by physically removing a critical line. The confi-
dential information leaked by information flow will assist
or accelerate the attackers.
3.1 DEFINING INFORMATION FLOW
IN CFPS
In a CFPS, decisions are made cooperatively and dis-
tributively. The decision making information is what needs
to be kept confidential. The internal settings and control op-
erations of a single UPFC or the interaction between mul-
tiple UPFCs are defined as confidential (in the High-Level
domain) in [18].
Figure 1 shows the interaction between the UPFC and
the power system. An attacker is shown in Figure 1 and can
only read the power flow over the low-level object, Con-
trolledLine, which is in the Low-Level domain. Controlled-
Line is inherently exposed due to the physical nature of its
open access. The UPFC is a high-level object in the High-
Level domain. Since the attacker usually will not be able
to attack the UPFC itself due to physical protection such as
those required by CIP-006-1, we force the system boundary
to stop at ControlledLine.
Theorem 1, the system constructed of the UPFC de-
vice connected with ControlledLine is Nondeducible se-
cure [21].
As shown in Figure 2, changes in power flow over Con-
trolledLine can be affected by the local settings or by Net-
work Parameter Updates that propagate. Even more, it
could be affected by the topology change of power lines
(such as a line trip), which triggers the redistribution of the
power flow for the system. That is to say, by only observ-
ing the events interfering with the ControlledLine, no clue
of where the information is from can be formed. From the
interface model point of view, the system is secure such that
no confidential information is exposed through information
flow1
The remainder of this paper casts this model of the CFPS
using the formal process algebra SPA.
3.1.1 SPA
Security Process Algebra (SPA, for short) [7] [9][11] is
an extension of the Calculus of Communicating Systems
(CCS) [17] - a language proposed to specify concurrent
systems, that defines an algebra consisting of operators for
building systems using a bottom-up approach from smaller
subsystems. The basic building blocks are atomic activities,
called actions; unlike CCS, in SPA, actions belong to two
different levels of confidentiality, thus allowing the specifi-
cation of multilevel (actually, two-level) systems. The BNF
Syntax of SPA to describe the system is [9]:
E ::= 0|µ.E|E1+E2|E1|E2|E\L|E\IL|E/L|E[ f ]|Z
where 0 is the empty process, which does no action; µ.E
does action µ and then behaves like E; E1+E2 can alterna-
tively choose to behave like E1 or E2; E1|E2 is the parallel
1However, in Theorem 3 of [21] we show that an attacker, with se-
mantic knowledge of power electronics, can deduce control settings by
monitoring ControlledLine
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Figure 3. UPFC device security boundary at
ControlledLine
composition of E1 and E2, where the executions of the two
systems are interleaved, E\L can execute all the actions E
is able to do, provided that they do not belong to L∪ L¯ (L¯
refer to the output); E\IL requires that the actions of E do
not belong to L∩ I; E/L turns all the actions in L into inter-
nal τ’s; if E can execute action µ, then E[ f ] performs f (µ);
finally, Z does what E does, if Z ≡de f E.
3.1.2 SPA Model for the UPFC at the ControlledLine
boundary









.i f (l >= x).then.
write(l,z).W¯ (x,z).Behavior2
else.i f (x == l).then.
write(l,z).W¯ (1,z).Behavior2
else.Behavior2
Ob ject(x,y) = R¯.Ob ject(0,P)+W (x,y).Ob ject(x,y)
Here M_read(l,x)/M_write(l,x) stand for events where
the subject of security level l reads/writes to an object of se-
curity level x. y and z are the values (or states) of the object.
The above SPA describes the system behavior and possible
executions. The system behavior is shown in Figure 3.
3.1.3 SPA Model of the UPFC with timing constraints
In a Cyber-Physical system, security requirements are cou-
pled with other kinds of requirements such as nonfunctional
requirements, e.g. performance requirements. In the CFPS,
the security requirement of information security has the po-
tential of coupling with the real-time requirement of the sys-
tem. However, the security models that are widely used do
not always consider real-time or temporal behavior of the
system. The analysis in the previous section, which uses
the current available security models, cannot illustrate the
possible security issues involving these temporal aspects.
Observe Figure 1; if the attacker passively attaches
power flow meters to the low-level object ControlledLine
and logs power flow data, the attacker could observe some
significant changes of the power flow at certain time inter-
vals and infer the system update rate. For example, the data
given in Table 3.1.3 gives a glimpse of a line flow log. Here,
the data are based on lab data which is aiming at testing the
load change and the UPFC’s response.
Table 1. Timestamped observation of Con-
trolledLine



















From this trace, it can be seen that the attacker gathers
the line flow information every 5ms. In other words, it has
a sampling rate of 200Hz. Observing the change rate of the
line flow, the attacker can infer that after a significant line
flow change (at 190505ms), at least every 5ms, there is a
change that causes the line flow to drop. However, around
every 100ms, the line flow will be balanced back to a higher
setting. Knowledgeable attackers could start a brief analysis
of the CFPS based on acquired information:
• 190505 ms, some contingency happens (location not
yet known) that causes the ControlledLine to have a
flow change of around 20%
• At least every 5ms, the line flow drops by 2%, which
means there is something withdrawing power flow
from the ControlledLine at least every 5ms
• At least every 100ms, the line flow is changed by 6%,
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which means there is some other mechanism injecting
power flow to the ControlledLine at least every 100ms
With the above observation, the attacker obtains knowl-
edge about the system response time of the UPFC, which is
around 5-100ms.
The above analysis regarding the system’s behavior, with
temporal constraints taken into consideration, is based on
our lab experience. A formal description needs to be given
in order to use a model checking tool to prove the correct-
ness of the security of information flow with timing con-
siderations. Previous literature [8][11] has introduced ways
of adapting time in the security model. Time is represented
by a tick to describe the system’s time in a discrete manner
according to the global clock. (e.g. system = write. . .sys-
tem), where internal events will always follow write events
and take a unit of time. In the current approach, to include
the temporal constraints in the SPA, the CFPS’s behavior
is chosen by extending the value passing SPA by one more
value, the time interval. The line flow change observation
is based on the information of ControlledLine, so we set the
security boundary of the FACTS device to the Controlled-
Line.
UPFC_ControlledLinetime =
(Behavior2t |Ob ject(0,Pint , t)|Ob ject(1,Pint , t))\L
Behavior2time = M_read(l,x, t)




.(i f (l >= x)then
write(l,z, t).W¯ (x,z, t).Behavior2time
else.i f (x == l)then
write(l,z, t).W¯ (1,z, t).Behavior2time
else.Behavior2time
Ob ject(x,P, t) = R¯(x,P, t).Ob ject(x,P, t)
+W (x,P′, t).Ob ject(x,P′, t)
Figure 4 shows the CFPS behavior with timing con-
straints. This formal expression of the system’s execution
sequence and the temporal constraints form the input to
model checking. As seen from the informal analysis, the
conclusion has been drawn that the real-time constraints do
affect the security properties. In this case, the security re-
quirement on information flow needs to be updated with the
real-time constraints to reflect the situation.
4 RESULTS
The SPA models (without and with timing) were en-
coded into CoPS to check for BNDC. CoPS is an automatic
checker of a multilevel system’s security properties [4]. In
Figure 4. Behavior of FACTS considering tim-
ing constraints
Figure 5. CFPS timing constraints and cor-
responding model to interpret the elapse of
time
order to include timing in the CoPS model, a special oper-
ation called "tick" is used. "Tick" does nothing but act as
an atomic operation and represents the clock of the entire
system moving by one unit of time. Figure 5 lists the tim-
ing constraints of the CFPS system. These can be translated
into a corresponding number of tick operations in the CoPS
model. The actual frequency ratio between the objects is
1000:330:1, however, in the CoPS model used a reduced
number of ticks is used to reduce the complexity of model
checking. The pattern of the frequencies is kept close to this
ratio, but is not exact. Details of the CoPS model input are
found in [20].
Table 2. Results of applying CoPS against
UPFC models described by SPA
System Satisfy Number Compo
BNDC of States -sable
ControlledLine Yes 36 Yes
(Without Time)
ControlledLine No 49 No
(With time)
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From the results listed in Table 2, conclusions can be
drawn that for the security properties of UPFC system,
without considering the timing constraints, the UPFC sys-
tem satisfies BNDC. This is a stricter result than those stated
in Theorem 1, since Section Theorem 1 only claims the
UPFC system with the security boundary at ControlledLine,
satisfies Nondeducibility. However, as stated in [14], some
systems that satisfy the Nondeducible security property are
not composable. This affects further consideration of the
composed UPFC system with other systems to preserve se-
curity.
Conceptually, the system satisfies the BNDC because the
internal events brought by LTC have been taken into consid-
eration. These internal events lead to e4. Being more spe-
cific, the event system shown in Figure 2, has been modified
to allow e4 to be a legal trace in the system by introducing
the internal event τ. The system traces became {{}, τ.e4,
e1e4, e2e4, e1e2e4,...}. This system satisfies BNDC since
from the observation point of view, the observed result is
compatible with any high-level input even when composed
with other systems [9].
By contrast, the CFPS with timing constraints does not
satisfy BNDC and is not composable. Intuitively, the fail-
ure to satisfy BNDC by adding timing information to the
CFPS shows it is highly possible that timing constraints can
be deduced or inferred by the observer. Timing is a com-
mon property in a CPS. It is something both trusted secu-
rity domains and others can observe and forms an inherent
vulnerability to confidentiality.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper illustrates the importance of information flow
security in a CPS, provides a model of the information flow
in a CPS, and formalizes the system and using automatic
checking tools to prove security properties. BNDC is im-
portant as CPSs are usually more or less composed of var-
ious physical and cyber systems. However, the failure to
satisfy BNDC under timing indicates that CPSs have inher-
ent composability limitations. This paper’s contribution is
to bring information flow analysis to bear on understanding
the security limitations of Cyber-Physical systems.
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